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How do we talk about riots?

Pay close attention to the ways that the powerful describe the voiceless and assign blame. That’s where you will see the pathology of power in this society.

Interpreting social disorder: the case of the 1907 Vancouver anti-Asian riots

By Julie Gilmour

Originally published in International Journal, Winter 2011-12

On August 8th, 2011, civil disorder seemed to be spreading without any effective state intervention in London. For hours BBC correspondents broadcast shocked commentary live on air as looters openly broke into shops in Hackney and a long established furniture business in Croydon burned to the ground. As commentators reached for explanations or even descriptions of the events as they unfolded, increasingly strident voices emerged frequently accusing analysts of ‘sympathy’ for the rioters merely because they sought to find an explanation.  

By coincidence, I found myself in the National Archives of the United Kingdom during this crisis researching Britain’s response to an older disorder, the 1907 anti-Asian riots in Vancouver. It was therefore unavoidable that I should spend the week minding the gap between an historical approach to events and the kinds of responses that emerged in the midst of social disorder.

Historians spend quite a bit of time assessing events without necessarily excusing the behaviour of the participants. We address events with the assumption that to a large extent governments and rioters behave within a range of possibilities defined by both their character and the historical context.  We are comfortable with explanations that include a variety of factors.  In fact, historical inquiry encourages us to approach social crises as events with multiple causes and consequences for society and government at many levels. Some cases of local disorders have tales to tell about the international, even global context of the time. How then might we use an historical approach to disorders to increase our public capacity for thoughtful engagement with current events? And, what lessons can we identify and use to communicate the importance of analysis in the wake of a social crisis?  We might begin with the following propositions:

1/ that even the ‘villains’ act within an historical context and that acknowledging this does not necessarily excuse their behaviour.

2/ that fear may have real effects on people’s choices even when it is based on misperceptions.

3/ that local events are not always only about the local.

This paper will begin with a description of one case of civil disorder, the 1907 Vancouver anti-Asian riot.  It will describe the kinds of explanations that contemporary commentators reached for in the weeks immediately after the crisis.  Then a brief inspection of historical writing about the same events will show how these three propositions emerge convincingly from an historical approach. The 1907 Vancouver crisis has significant implications for the international relations of a number of states and will therefore facilitate the practice of thinking historically and transnationally.

On Labour Day, the seventh of September 1907, a trade union march protesting against Asian immigration flared out of control leading to significant property damage in Vancouver’s Chinese and Japanese neighbourhoods. The Vancouver police managed to restore order by daybreak, and Vancouver awoke to see that every glass window in the Chinese and Japanese districts had been broken. While there were a handful of people who were injured during the violence, no fatalities occurred during the night.  Twenty-four people had been arrested and charged with crimes related to the violence.  Attention quickly turned to assessing the factors that led to this embarrassing breakdown in civility.

The disquiet felt by Canadians was all the keener due to the fact that these events had an international audience and might have serious consequences for not only Canada’s relationship with Japan, but for the web of relationships existing between the United States, Great Britain, China, Japan and India.  These anti-immigration disorders occurred at a time when Canada was a Dominion of Great Britain with its foreign policy still officially overseen by the Colonial Office in London. In addition to this legal and colonial relationship, British Columbia’s geography and migration had ensured close ties with the American Pacific Northwest where trouble over Asian migration and labour had been heating up since the 1880s. The riots raised discussions across Canada, in Ottawa, in Tokyo, in the United States and in London on the question of the riot’s causes and the implications of Canada’s approach to Asian immigration policy.

Initially, Canadian and British officials wondered if Canadians could ensure the safety of Chinese and Japanese nationals in Vancouver; if it was possible to discover who was responsible; whether there was an American role in the disorder; and what were the implications of Canadian attitudes towards Asian immigration for Britain’s relationship with Japan, China and India?

The first communication to the Foreign Office in London about the disorders came on September 9, 1907 from the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires, who had received a telegram from Vancouver and was concerned about the lives and property of Chinese subjects resident in Vancouver. By September 11, London had been assured by Earl Grey, Canada’s Governor General, the Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and Vancouver’s Mayor Alexander Bethune that the disorders were over and no further violence was immediately expected. Once the pressing need to ensure the safety of foreign nationals had passed, assessments of the diplomatic challenges into which Canada had dropped the UK came to the fore.

Great Britain’s 1894 Commercial Treaty with Japan, to which Canada had signed on in 1906, required the Canadian government to treat Japan as a “most-favoured-nation,” and to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens. By requesting to become a party to this treaty, Canada had agreed to the terms previously agreed upon by Britain and Japan to allow Japanese subjects “full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the dominions…” and “protection of property”.[1] Therefore when the attacks on Japanese businesses in Vancouver drew the attention of the Japanese Consul in Ottawa, they required immediate diplomatic intervention from the British mission in Tokyo despite assurances from Earl Grey that “disturbances were directed at Asiatics generally rather than against Japanese.”[2]

The Foreign Office was gratified that Laurier had personally sent assurances to the Japanese Government of Canadian intentions via the British Embassy in Tokyo and had refused to denounce the 1894 Treaty. Nevertheless, concerns about future disorders initiated by Canadian opponents of Asian immigration remained an issue since anti-Asian organizations continued to press the government for increased restrictions on Japanese immigration.  The situation was further complicated by Laurier’s decision to send Rodolphe Lemieux, the Minister of Labour (and Postmaster General), to Japan in October 1907 to negotiate an agreement that would almost entirely eliminate Japanese migration to Canada, without informing the British mission in Tokyo of his aims before he sailed from Vancouver. By that time it was too late to send written credentials and the official authority to negotiate a fairly sensitive issue for Canada with the full backing of the British government. Instead, a telegram was rushed to Claude MacDonald, Britain’s Ambassador in Tokyo, asking him to present Lemieux and Joseph Pope to the Japanese authorities with “the approval of His Majesty’s Government” and to give him any assistance he might need.[3]

Both the Japanese and British governments were satisfied with Canada’s swift apology and assurance that the riots did not reflect Canada’s official feelings toward Japan, but explanations for the violence were needed. Official explanations from Britain and Canada in 1907 followed two dominant themes—that the riots were either the result of unusually high levels of Asian immigration to Vancouver or could be attributed to the work of American agitators.  

The Canadian Privy Council order sending Lemieux to Japan identified rising immigration numbers as its primary concern.  His mission was undertaken “in view of the recent unfortunate occurrences which have taken place in British Columbia, as a result of the largely increased influx of oriental labourers into that Province…”[4]

Lemieux’s diplomatic memorandum proposing limits on Japanese immigration focused on the perceived difficulties for Canada that arose due to increasing numbers of Japanese arrivals. As he told the Japanese: “This unexpected volume of immigration has unfortunately given rise to certain disturbances and to a strong racial prejudice in the Province of British Columbia, whereby a number of Japanese residents have recently suffered maltreatment.”[5]  According to this document, British Columbia’s physical isolation from the rest of Canada and small population left the Province vulnerable to influence from the United States “where the same question is agitating the public mind, and threatens to combine all classes, irrespective of boundaries, in one common cause…”[6] Earl Grey also attempted to explain the importance of an immigration agreement for Canada to the Colonial Office citing “the strong racial prejudices” among “people on the Pacific Coast” which were “to be regretted yet ha[d] to be taken into consideration by all who desire[d] to cultivate best relations between Canada and the Orient.”[7] 

Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, emphasised the importance of the American Executive Order of March 1907, which excluded Japanese labourers from travel to the continental USA and its impact on the number of Japanese migrants arriving in Canada.  When the United States began to turn Japanese away from the ports of San Francisco and Los Angeles after March 1907, those leaving Hawaii due to labour disputes and fears of the plague found themselves travelling in large numbers to Vancouver instead. The result was a huge number of ‘Japanese’ immigrants arriving (via Hawaii) despite Japanese assurances that they would restrict the numbers of Japanese permits for travel to Canada.

This culture of anti-Asian agitation was shared up and down the Pacific coast of North America. Throughout the region groups were organized with the aim of achieving full exclusion of Asian immigrants. The Seattle Anti-Japanese and Korean League was poised in September 1907 to take advantage of Vancouver’s rising fear and anger about the number of Japanese immigrants. The result was the Labour Day demonstration that led to violence.

The British Foreign Office was convinced that American “interference” in Canadian anti-Asian activities seemed “clear.”[8] A report from an undercover source in the Vancouver Asiatic Exclusion League was the first detailed account of the disorders to arrive in London. This interpretation of events went so far as to claim that not only was the Vancouver Asiatic Exclusion League influenced by American groups, but that the Americans in attendance originally intended to hold this event in Seattle and moved it to Vancouver when the prominent Japanese official they were targeting changed his schedule.  It even names A.E. Fowler, the Secretary of the Seattle Anti-Japanese and Korean League, as the individual “who proposed a march through the Chinese and Japanese quarters and “the same person who led the attacks on the Hindoos at Bellingham,” referring to vigilante violence against migrants from India in a town near the British Columbia border..  Although there may be no way to confirm the claim, this report even states that “it was some boys directed by Fowler who threw the first stones” leading directly to the outbreak of mob violence.  Individual Americans known to officials for their activism on Asian exclusion are singled out here and held to be directly responsible for turning protest into violent disorder.[9] The Governor General, likely reporting the same opinions he read in this agent’s account, believed there was “…good reason for the belief that the Vancouver riots were fomented by agitators coming from the United States.”[10]

James Bryce, the British Ambassador in Washington provided his own interpretation of events based on his set of reports coming from Seattle. The Foreign Office was in fairly close contact with him on the question because of the involvement of anti-Asian activists in the mistreatment of Sikhs in Bellingham who were “natives of British India.” He was painfully aware of how complicated the situation had become and how “far-reaching” it was in its implications. [11]

There had been, according to Bryce, general irritation in the United States over the Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed in 1902. The treaty was intended to control the expansion of Russia in the Pacific, but had the effect of limiting American naval interests as well. While he could accept that there was pleasure in some quarters over the thought of a rift between the two powers, he was unwilling to attribute the United States government any active policy designed to encourage disorder in Vancouver.

It would be incautious at present, and it would probably prove incorrect to infer any deliberate policy on the part of any American authority to embarrass the relations between Great Britain and Japan.  But it would not be too much to say that there has evidently been no feeling of regret that the anti-oriental agitation in British Columbia, with its expected effects on Anglo-Japanese relations, has been greatly aggravated by American agency.[12]

Bryce therefore acknowledged the role of agitators like Fowler, suggested that the original intent was to hold the event in Seattle and maintained the United States government’s blamelessness in the matter.

We can see that in the immediate wake of the disorders the focus was on the short term irritants which led to violence such as the actions of individual ‘rowdies’, American agitators like Fowler or, as we will see below, on the perception that increasing numbers of Asian immigrants were arriving at the port of Vancouver. Boyce’s commentary was more perceptive than most, but still generally emphasised the role of particular individuals.  This separates contemporary assessments from most of the historical literature.

1/ Even the ’bad guys’ do what they do within an historical context and that this does not necessarily excuse their behaviour.

In contrast to the explanations that emerged in the weeks immediately following the disorder, historians have pointed to a wider array of factors in assessing possible causes.  Often these explanations have included a variety of local, international, long-term and short-term causes.  By placing Fowler and his ilk into a broader historical context that included the origins of a racist political culture, economic recession, the underpinnings of tension between ‘white’ and ‘Asian’ workers, fear, and the political divisions between BC’s provincial government and Ottawa, historical assessments began to provide us with an idea of the kinds of factors that led to the violence; beyond the moral character of individuals who chose to march, speak or throw stones and their immediate concerns.

In the existing historical literature the role of the United States in these events is far less straightforward than the initial reports believed.  The Governor General informed London that the “rowdies” responsible for the violence were spurred on by American agitators.  This was based in truth to a certain extent, but was also a fairly limited view and simply convenient for both the British and Canadian governments who wished to distance their subjects from accusations of violence against the subjects of treaty partners and who were more sympathetic to the goals than the means of the protesters. It was indeed true that several American activists, including Fowler, gave speeches in the moments before the demonstration turned from political protest to mob violence. Fowler has been blamed in several sources for riling up the already unhappy crowd by suggesting that like the city of Bellingham, Vancouver could rid itself of East Indians through vigilante action.

Although Peter Ward emphasised this factor, West Coast racial prejudices, in his book White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia, he disagreed with the Foreign Office and with Wilfrid Laurier on the role of American influence and agitation as a cause of the disorders. While acknowledging that an inflammatory speech was made by Fowler in the hours before the riot broke out, he disagreed with any claim that the riot was an organized event at all.  His analysis suggests that it was a spontaneous expression of “racial grievance” built upon old racist perceptions, a desire for a “homogenous” British province, and on-going frustration with Ottawa.[13]

Patricia E. Roy’s White Man’s Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914 is largely an account of the social, political and economic context of anti-Asian activity in British Columbia as it developed in the decades between the arrival of BC’s first Chinese immigrant labourers during the gold rush and the 1907 riots. For Roy, the question goes far beyond mere racial prejudice, immigration policy or American agitation to include the structural causes of political rhetoric (Asians had been disenfranchised) and the economic foundations of labour unrest (non-Asian BC workers were used to high wages because of the relative scarcity of labour in a resource-based economy and therefore feared the importation of workers who could be paid lower wages.)

In other words, Roy’s work, like the others mentioned here, is interested in the actions of individuals, but considers the time and place within which choices were made, that is, within their historical context. By asking questions designed to help us understand the crisis rather than looking for someone to blame, these historians are able to discuss the reasons for discontent without necessarily excusing the behaviour.

2/ Fear may have real effects on behaviour even when it is based on misperceptions.

Ken Adachi’s account of the 1907 riots in The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians puts emphasis on Fowler’s inflammatory speech as an immediate cause of the violence, but also provides an account of the wider culture of racism.  According to Adachi rumours and racist ideas had been stoked by newspaper accounts and politicians looking to score points with fearful BC voters. When in the summer of 1907 the numbers of Japanese and Sikh migrants increased due to labour disputes, anti-Asian violence and increasingly exclusionary immigration controls in the United States, the stage was set for mob violence in Vancouver.

Howard Sugimoto also provided a comprehensive account of American political factors and the mechanisms of immigration to Canada in his discussion of the riots and their effects in Japanese Immigration, The Vancouver Riots and Canadian Diplomacy. His work clearly pointed out to his readers that immigration fears were based on problematic statistics and record keeping at Canada’s ports.  For example, ‘immigration’ numbers included Japanese in transit elsewhere, those who were already permanent residents of Canada but returning from abroad, and those who were arriving from Hawaii rather than Japan.  Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the number of Japanese faces at Vancouver’s port increased in the summer of 1907 and this caused great concern for some.  Sugimoto took his analysis a step further and considered the effects of the fear of a combination of increased Japanese, Chinese and Sikh arrivals to the city, isolation from Ottawa, anxiety, and the significant economic recession in 1907.

As if anything further were required, the immigrant influx from Hawaii coincided with the peak of the immigration from Japan and the devastatingly large numbers from Hawaii added fuel to the already burning issue at the most critical of crucial times.  The crisis was reached in early September, two days after the Hindu massacre in Bellingham, just beyond the international border.[14]

According to Sugimoto, the numbers from Hawaii at the beginning of 1907 were less than 100 per month and rose slowly after March, but became inflammatory in July when 1,444 Japanese from Hawaii landed, 1, 189 from off the Kumeric alone.[15]  These immigrants were not controlled by the Japanese government since they had traveled from Hawaii rather than Japan, but Canadians had a hard time seeing the difference and accused the Japanese of ignoring their promises to restrict emigration. So despite the fact that we now know that the numbers of Japanese nationals immigrating to Canada was technically lower than the numbers popularized in the press and the pulpit, fear turned to organization, demonstration and ultimately destructive behaviour. As historians we are interested both in the ‘real’ numbers as well as responses to the perceived crisis.

3/ Local events are not always only about the local.

Henry Yu, John Price and others have been working to place British Columbia and Vancouver’s histories in a wider Pacific context.[16] Although the real and direct connections between exclusionists on both sides of the border were known and perhaps over emphasised in 1907, current work explores Canada’s historic connections with the diplomatic, social and economic life of the USA’s Pacific Coast and other Pacific states.  This Pacific focus is a welcome addition to the discussion, particularly when it is combined with an appreciation of Canada’s transatlantic influences, including the Asian diplomacy of Great Britain in the years before the First World War.  

Canada’s swift offer to provide compensation to the Japanese for their losses in Vancouver tells us a great deal. By 16 October, Earl Grey had reported to London that in response to a Japanese request for action on the matter, William Lyon Mackenzie King had been appointed to lead a Commission to investigate Japanese damages related to the riots.[17] Mackenzie King was a young, ambitious, skilled bureaucrat on the rise in 1907. He had extensive experience in labour matters and could be trusted to be both intelligent and discreet when handling a sensitive matter. His swift selection demonstrates the seriousness with which the government took its obligations under the 1894 Commercial Treaty with Japan despite the extraordinary pressure from some quarters in British Columbia for increasing the pressure on the Japanese government to limit migration.

Japan itself supported investigations, but of a different kind than Mackenzie King was offering. The Japanese English language press coverage of the riots supported continued investigation writing that it was “a good opportunity for jointly investigating the underlying causes which [were] responsible for these outbursts of feeling and for applying a remedy if possible.”[18] While compensation was welcome, Japan was also seeking to maintain its relationship with Britain and reduce the amount of hostility being directed at Japanese in North America as a whole.

Despite the early communication from the Chinese Government, it took longer for Chinese damages to emerge as a priority due to the different relationship Britain (and therefore Canada) had with its government. While Canadians were exhorted by the Foreign Office to treat Japan as “a civilized nation” and an ally with treaty privileges,[19] it was not until a memo from the Peking mission reminded London that compensation discussions in Vancouver could be used to pressure China into changing its position on granting compensation to Britons who had suffered similar losses that a Commission for Chinese losses was discussed.[20] The Foreign Office decided that compensation for losses in Vancouver could be used as a “lever” to push China into moving on the issue.[21]

Britain’s concerns about American involvement in the Vancouver riots of 1907 went beyond merely identifying the causes of the disorder. They were linked directly with the fear of the possibility that British Columbia might ally itself with California and Washington State on the issue of Asian immigration and exclusion. The harm this might do to British diplomacy was an irritant, but fears of British Columbia forming a “solidarity of interests”[22] with the United States was concern in Foreign Office calculations.

Thus, when we approach the events of 1907 from an historical and transnational perspective the civil disorders offer us a way to investigate more than the course of events on September 7, 1907 in Vancouver.  Indeed the disorders provide us with insight into Canada’s changing position as a Dominion of Great Britain, about Britain’s strained relationship with the United States at the turn of the century, about global labour migration, and the racial framework within which British (and Canadian and American) diplomats were managing China, Japan and India.  

The causes of London’s 2011 riots are still up for debate.  Opinions crystallized around two poles; individual criminality or poverty, racism and government cutbacks.  No doubt each of these factors played a role as events unfolded.  But in light of our discussion, what larger narratives might we, as contemporary historians, find to tell about these events?

We would acknowledge that in seeking to understand the disorder we must consider the short-term sparks that led to the violence as well as the long-term context in which choices were made.  Neither the police shooting that ignited the first night of violence, nor the looting that followed occurred in a vacuum. Even if future research reveals that individual looters had their own motivations more or less closely linked with politics, their pocketbook, or race; factors such as the years of police profiling in these neighbourhoods; economic downturn; and all-pervasive consumer culture will surely be part of any histories of the disorders.  We may even find that these events have a story to tell about global communications, social networking, government control and surveillance. These ideas are based on an historian’s intuition at the moment.  The research is yet to be done, but part of my point in this essay is to give insights to non-historians as to how thinking like an historian can improve journalists’ and public policy professionals’ understanding of contemporary and past events.

In this light, I understand that most journalists and public policymakers, and of course regular citizens, don’t have ready access to archival or sociological materials to confirm our ideas about the causes of disorders, but every person attempting to understand the world can ask the kinds of questions that lead historians through their research. The first step might be to ask, “What are people saying caused this?”  When we read their answers to the question we ask a new set of questions.  “Why might this answer be attractive to this person?”  “What is the advantage to taking this point of view?” “Why might they see the events from this perspective?” “What are they trying to accomplish?” Of course, it is important to remember that just because it is convenient for an individual or a group to endorse one interpretation does not mean that it is not a valid one, but one can always look deeper with a healthy scepticism for each claim, including those of the historians. [23]

We have seen that there is a real gap between public reactions to disorder as it occurs and the ways that historians conceive of the factors that lead to crisis.  Historians are able to place action within a larger framework, they recognize that sometimes fear, whether well-founded or not, has real consequences, and that explanations may be found a world away. These insights can be used to improve our understanding and interpretation of social disorder in at least two ways.

First, we historians should draw from this the reminder that when we interpret documents produced in the wake of social disruption that they may reveal more about the people and organizations that produced them than the events themselves. Our sources will place blame on easy targets.  They will minimize their own involvement.  They will point to factors that support their pre-existing political and ideological positions.  Knowing this we may approach them with greater subtlety and awareness and perhaps avoid falling prey to easy explanations while at the same time recognizing why people do so in the first place.

Second, knowledge of this gap and a few useful research questions may assist journalists, commentators, policy-makers and the public to move beyond knee-jerk reactions to disorder more quickly.  Rather than leaping to blame “criminality” we can begin to assess the framework within which the decision to loot or riot occurs. Rather than looking narrowly for the answer, the public conversation may consider a variety of explanations even when they make us uncomfortable.


[1] National Archives of the United Kingdom (NA), FO 371/271 Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966; Japan. Code 23 File 2332-8682; p. 297 (verso) and 298.

[2] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 193.

[3] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 226.

[4] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 281.

[5] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 411 verso.

[6] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 412.

[7] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 260.

[8] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 205.

[9] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 329.

[10] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 228.

[11] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 208-10.

[12] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 210.

[13] W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990).

[14] Howard H. Sugimoto, Japanese Immigration, the Vancouver Riots and Canadian Diplomacy (New York: Arno Press, 1978) 114.

[15] ibid 107.

[16] Henry Yu, “Global Migrants and the New Pacific Canada” in International Journal v. 64 no. 4 (Autumn 2009) pp. 1011-1026 and John Price, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire and the Transpacific (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).

[17] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 276 and 277.

[18] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 271-3.

[19] NA, FO 371/271, Japan. Code 23 File 2332-8682, p. 292.

[20] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 285-6.

[21] NA, FO 371/274, Japan. Code 23 File 22241-30377, p. 290 (verso).

[22] NA, FO 881/10298X, Memorandum respecting Japanese immigration into Canada and the United States, p. 2.

[23] Thank you to Jeff Kilpatrick for pushing me to consider the ways historians and non-historians think about current events and conclusions.

Title: Building damaged during Vancouver riot of 1907 – 545 Powell Street, $58 Reminder: Reminder: No known copyright restrictions. Please credit UBC Library as the image source. For more information see http://digitalcollections.library.ubc.ca/cdm/about. Date: 1907 Access Identifier: JCPC_ 36_014 Source: Original Format: University of British Columbia Library. Rare Books are Special Collections. Japanese Canadian Research Collection. JCPC_ 36_014 Permanent URL: http://digitalcollections.library.ubc.ca/cdm/ref/collection/jphotos/id/108
Title: Building damaged during Vancouver riot of 1907 – 545 Powell Street, $58 Reminder: Reminder: No known copyright restrictions. Please credit UBC Library as the image source. For more information see http://digitalcollections.library.ubc.ca/cdm/about. Date: 1907 Access Identifier: JCPC_ 36_014 Source: Original Format: University of British Columbia Library. Rare Books are Special Collections. Japanese Canadian Research Collection. JCPC_ 36_014 Permanent URL: http://digitalcollections.library.ubc.ca/cdm/ref/collection/jphotos/id/108
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